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RECENT CASES
Conflict of Laws-Effect of Comity Statute Upon Application of
Law of the Forum to Statute of Limitations-Defendant, purchaser
of Florida realty, assumed a mortgage by a sealed conveyance. Seven
years after default, the purchaser of the mortgage note sued in Ohio for
the unpaid portion of the mortgage debt. Defendant pleaded the Statute
of Limitations. Ohio had abolished the effectiveness of the private seal,:
and had a fifteen year limitation on written contracts. Florida had a twenty
year limitation upon sealed instruments, and a five year bar to written con-
tracts. The court based its decision upon a statute directing that when a
cause of action arose in a state having a shorter bar than Ohio then in "like
causes of action" that bar shall govern in Ohio. Held, for defendant, the
Florida five year limitation barred the claim. Alropa Corporation v. Kirch-
wehm, 138 Ohio 30, 33 N. E. (2d) 655 (1941).
The general rule is that statutes of limitations are remedial and not
substantive considerations.2  This causes the operation of the law of the
forum when a defendant raises this defense. The rule is based upon the
right of the sovereign state to establish a time after which it regards evi-
dence a doubtful value. Thus an action barred by a time limitation in
one state may be instituted in another state wherein a longer period of
time is allowed for the institution of a suit. The desirability of such a situ-
ation has been questioned." As a result, statutes have been passed to pro-
tect a citizen from a suit in his native courts by a foreign litigant when the
action is barred in the foreign state in which the right to sue arose. This
was the intent of the legislature in the comity statute, as evidenced by grant-
ing to the defendant the benefit of a foreign statute of limitations effective
within a lesser number of years when he is sued upon a cause of action
arising in a foreign state.4 This statute changes the common law rule of
the applicability of the lex fori to a defense of the statute of limitations.
The instant statute plainly states that if the bar to the suit in the foreign
state is shorter than the Ohio bar, the court is to apply the limitation of
the foreign state. The result of the instant decision was to bar an action
that was valid abroad (upon a sealed instrument 5) and in Ohio (upon- a
written contract 6), a result never intended by the legislature. The instant
decision results in an Ohio court's ruling that a Florida written contract
statute of limitations of five years 7 bars collection upon an instrument that
I. OHIO CODE ANN. (Throckrnorton's Baldwin, 1940) § 32.
2. 3 BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (935) §§ 603.1, 604.1; DICEY,
THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (5th ed., 1932) § 203; GOODRICH, HANDBOOK ON THE CONFLICT
OF LAWS (2nd ed., 1938) § 82; RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934) H8 603, 604.
For a collection of cases see Note (1937) io9 A. L. R. 479.
3. LeRoy v. Crownshield, 2 Mason 151, Fed. Cas. No. 8269 (182o) (wherein Story
expresses the thought stated in the text). Lorenzen, Statute of Limitations and Con-
fict of Laws (IgIg) 28 YALE L. J- 492.
4. OHIO CODE ANN. (Throckanorton's Baldwin, 194o) § 11234. "Action, time for
bringing-If the laws of any state or country where the cause of action arose limits
the time for the commencement of the action to a less number of years than do the
statutes of this state in like causes of action then said cause of action shall be barred
in this state at the expiration of said lesser number of years." Note (1931) 75 A. L. R.
203 (concerning the effect of a statute of forum which admits bar of other state and
cases decided thereunder) ; (i94i) 15 U. OF CiN. L. REV. 337.
5. 2 FLA. ComP. LAWS ANN. (Skillman, 1928) § 4663, pt. I.
6. OHIO CODE ANN. (Throckinorton's Baldwin, 1940) § 11221.
7. 2 FLA. Comp. LAWS ANN. (Skillman, 1928) § 4663, Pt. 3.
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is still effective as a sealed obligation in Florida. The decision applied
rules of law based upon the legal systems of both Florida and Ohio, which
were not uniform in the important matters of limitations and classes of
written obligations. In using the common law rule the court partly fol-
lowed the lex fori in order to classify the instrument as a simple written
contract according to Ohio law, and in recognizing the comity statute they
were applying, in part, the lex loci of the Florida five year limitation upon
suits arising out of simple written contracts. The instant case is a fitting
example of the remark that "the term 'comity' . . . is open to the charge
of implying that the judge, when he applies the foreign law to a particular
case, does so as a matter of caprice or favor." 8
Judgments-Res Judicata in Favor of One Not a Party to the
Previous Litigation-In plaintiff's action against wholesaler for filling"cellophane" orders with manufacturer's product it had been held that the
word "cellophane" was not a valid trade-mark. Alleging trade-mark
infringement based on similar sales practices, plaintiff sued defendant, the
manufacturer, whose attorneys had openly defended the prior action. Held,
judgment in previous case estops plaintiff from maintaining the action.
2
E. I. Du Pont de Nemours and Company v. Sylvania Industrial Corpora,
tion, 122 F. (2d) 400 (C. C. A. 4th, 1941).
Repeated litigation of the same cause burdens both the individual and
the community. To regard the legal determination of facts as conclusive
is to reduce the weight of this burden. Recognition of this fact is embodied
in the doctrine of res judicata.8 Application of the doctrine is ordinarily
restricted so that the "estoppel" or "bar" of a former judgment affects
only the parties thereto and their privies.4 The basis for this limitation is
not clear.' Strict adherence thereto may permit repeated litigation of
adjudged points merely because one party to a suit had not been a party
to the prior action. Meagre authority suggests applying res judicata where
one not a party to the previous action seeks to invoke it against another
who was a party, while denying the comfort of the doctrine where the
latter seeks to invoke it against the former.8 The instant case represents
8. Conklin v. United States Shipbuilding Co., 123 Fed. 913, 916 (D. Me., 19o3).
i. Du Pont Cellophane Co. v. Waxed Products Co., 85 F. (2d) 75 (C. C. A. 2d,
1936) ; see Note (1937) 5 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 224; (1937) 37 COL. L. REV. 321.
2. Motion for a summary judgment was granted under Rule 56 of the FEDERAL
RU.LES or CiVm, PROCEDURE, following 48 STAT. lo64 (1941), 28 U. S. C. A. § 723 (c)
(194').
3. Bowin, THE DocrEiNE OF REs JUDICATA (1924) § 7.
4. 2. BLACK, JUDGIMSENTS (2d ed. 1902) § 534. For this purpose the word "parties"
may be said to include "all who are directly interested in the subject matter, and had
a right to make defence, or to control the proceedings, and to appeal from the judg-
men." I GREENLFAF, EVIDENCE (Rev. ed. 1896) § 523. By "privy" is meant one who
claims an interest in the subject-matter affected through or under one of the parties,
which interest was acquired after the judgment. 2 BLACK, JUDxMNTS (2d ed. i9o2)
§49.
5. A suggested rationale is based upon the premise that a litigant in a given action
may not, "because of consideration for his opponent or for other reasons personal to
himself," desire to press his every point to the utmost and the conclusion that it would
be unfair to allow failure due to this self-restraint to affect a second action against
another person. See Moschzisker, Res Judicata (929) 38 YALE L. J. 299, 303. But
see Coca-Cola Co. v. Pepsi-Cola Co., 6 Harr. 124, 133, 172 At. 26o, 264 (Del. Super.
Ct. 1934), 82 U. OF PA. L. REv. 871, 872. The persuasiveness of Moschzisker's
rationale may be increased by realization that one's failure to press every point to the
utmost may be due to poor counsel as often as to consideration or personal reasons.
6. Coca-Cola Co. v. Pepsi-Cola Co., 6 Harr. 124, 172 At. 26o (Del. Super. Ct.
1934) ; see E. I. Du Pont de Nemours and Co. v. Richmond Guano Co., 297 Fed. 58o,
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a different view, for the court's decision is based upon the premise that the
instant defendant would have been bound by a judgment favorable to the
plaintiff in the prior action.7 Furthermore, two conditions not required by
the most extreme authorities were precedent to the holding of the instant
court. These were the overt nature of the manufacturer's defense of the
prior action, and his complete control thereof." The exact problem pre-
sented by the instant case has arisen once before.9 The result was in
accord with that reached by the instant court. As regards parties, the
doctrine of res judicata appears to be a weapon of increasing convenience
in the hands of overcrowded courts. A further problem deserves mention.
The sales complained of in the prior case were to members of the public
as well as to paper-dealers, retailers and other members of the "trade". 0
"Cellophane" may have a meaning purely descriptive to such purchasers,
while indicating to the wholesaler that the Du Pont product is signified.
Since the instant defendant sold to wholesalers, plaintiff might well dispute
the applicability of res judicata on the ground that the exact point at issue
in the instant case has not previously been adjudicated."'
Labor Law-Reinstatement of Seamen After Strike on Vessel at
Dock-After the National Labor Relations Board had determined
seamen's bargaining representative and Company failed to comply with
Board's ruling, seamen struck and were discharged. The strike occurred
on Company's vessel moored safely at dock in Houston, Texas, during a
voyage from Philadelphia to Houston and return. The strikers committed
no acts of violence, but merely sat on the poop deck, refusing to obey the
582 (C. C. A. 4th, 1924) (res judicata rejected only because prior judgment had by
then been reversed); Cox, Res ANdi dcata,: Who Entitled to Plead (1923) 9 VA. L.
REG. (N. s.) 241, 254; Note (1926) 35 YALE L. J. 6o7, 611. Contra: Clair v. Sears
Roebuck and Co., 34 F. Supp. 559 (W. D. Mo. I94O). Most jurists would probably
refuse to depart so far from the equitable notion of mutuality. But see 7 BENTHAM'S
WoRxs (Bowring's ed. 1843) 171 referring to mutuality as "a maxim which one would
suppose to have found its way from the gaming-table to the bench."
7. Instant case at 405. Thus the court recognizes the doctrine of mutuality rather
than that of unilateral estoppel espoused by the authorities cited in note 6 supra. Res
judicata has been invoked against one who, not having been named as a party to the
previous action, nevertheless conducted the unsuccessful defense therein. Beyer Co. v.
Fleischmann Co., i5 F. (2d) 465 (C. C. A. 6th, 1926); Elliott Co. v. Roto Co., 242
Fed. 94i (C. C. A. 2d, 1917); Bemis Car Box Co. v. J. G. Brill Co., 200 Fed. 749
(C. C. A. 3rd, 1912) ; accord, Lovejoy v. Murray, 3 Wall. I (U. S. i865) ; Cushman v.
Warren-Scharf Asphalt Paving Co., 22o Fed. 857 (C. C. A. 7th, 1915) (distinguish-
able on ground defendants had been parties to prior litigation under definition quoted
in note 4 supra). Contra: White v. Croker, 13 F. (2d) 321 (C. C. A. 5th, 1926). But
cf. Rumford Chemical Works v. Hygienic Chemical Co., 215 U. S. 156 (i9o9) (ap-
plication of res judicata denied only because mere contribution to expenses of previous
litigation rather than actual control thereof).
8. Instant case at 404, 405.
9. Doherty Research Co. v. Universal Oil Products Co., io7 F. (2d) 548 (C. C.
A. 7th, 1939) ; see Souffront v. Compagnie Des Sucreries, 217 U. S. 475, 487 (1910).
But cf. Jefferson Electric Light, Heat & Power Co. v. Westinghouse Electric & Mfg.
Co., 139 Fed. 385 (C. C. A. 3rd, 19o5) (application of res judicata denied only be-
cause prior suit not defended "openly") ; Litchfield v. Goodnow's Administrator, 123
U. S. 549 (1887) (apparently contra but distinguishable on ground mere contribu-
tion to expenses of previous litigation rather than actual control thereof).
io. See Du Pont Cellophane Co. v. Waxed Products Co., 85 F. (2d) 75, 76, 8o
(C. C. A. 2d, 1936), 6 F. Supp. 859, 878 (S. D. Mich. 1934).
iT. In Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 Fed. 505 (S. D. N. Y. i92i) it was
held that a drug company might use the word "aspirin" in selling directly to con-
sumers, but might not do so in selling to druggists who, presumably, thought of
"aspirin" in terms of the Bayer product alone.
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Captain's order to "turn to." Company contended the strikers' conduct
constituted mutiny,' depriving them of protection under the National Labor
Relations Act.2 Board ordered reinstatement. Held (Clark, Circuit Judge,
dissenting), "the strikers were guilty of no unlawful conduct," and were
protected by the Act. Southern Steamship Company v. National Labor
Relations Board, 12o F. (2d) 505 (C. C. A. 3d, 1941).
The law of mutiny,8 imposing a duty of obedience on seamen, existed
long before the rights of organized labor were recognized. Modern labor
legislation, giving employees 4 the specific right that their employer shall
bargain with them through their appropriate representative 5 and buttress-
ing that right with the employees' privilege to strike, 6 raises the question,
on violation of the right, whether in the case of seamen the duty of obedi-
ence operates to curtail the privilege of striking. The duty is based on the
theory that full authority in the captain is necessary for the safety of the
ship, cargo, and passengers.7  It is not, however, an absolute duty, but
may be relaxed by the conditioning factors of time, place," and the rights
of seamenY The right in question springs from legislation which purposes
to create "a better relationship between labor and management," 10 and is
likewise limited.'1 If the strike, primarily an economic weapon, can be
effected without endangering property or life, or causing other than the
usual economic losses, it does not infringe on the sphere of operation of
the duty, and should be privileged 12 as a means of enforcing the right.
Since the vessel here was moored safely at dock in a domestic, though not
the home '13 port, and none of the danger contemplated by the mutiny law
was created, this general rule is applicable. The dissent's theory of com-
pleted voyage and its emphasis on discipline seems to ignore the philosophy
I. Company also contended strikers' conduct constituted a sit-down strike and that
discharge was justified under N. L. R. B. v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 3o6 U. S.
240, 59 Sup. Ct. 490, 123 A. L. R. 599 (1939), but the absence here of trespass and
violence clearly distinguish the case.
2. 48 STAT. 449 (1935), 29 U. S. C. A. § 151 et seq. (Supp. i94o). (Hereafter
cited as N. L. R. A.)
3. For adequate discussion of the development of the law of mutiny, see Sapiro
and Frank, Mutiny at the Dock (1936) 25 CAvLw. L. REV. 41; and Note (1939) 18
OE. L. REv. 128. For statutes now in force, see 35 STAT. 1146 (io9), I8 U. S. C. A.
§§483, 484 (927); Ca. CODE §§22, 293 (1909).
4. N. L. R. A. § 2 (3) defines 'employee" to include any employee not specifically
barred by the Act, as for example, agricultural workers. Seamen have been consid-
ered employees within the meaning of the act by the courts. Cf. South Atlantic S. S.
Co. v. N. L. R. B., 116 F. (2d) 480 (C. C. A. 5th, x941).
5. N. L. R. A. § 7, 8 (5), 9 (a).
6. Norris-LaGuardia Anti-Injunction Act,'47 STAT. 70, c. 90 (1932), 29 U. S. C.
A. § ioi et seq. (Supp. i94o) ; N. L. R. A. § I3.
7. Rees v. United States, 95 F. (2d) 784, 792 (C. C. A. 4th, 1938) ; Peninsular &
Occidental S. S. Co. v. N. L. R. B., 98 F. (2d) 411, 414 (C. C. A. 5th, 1938); McCrea
v. United States, 294 U. S. 23, 27 (935) ; O'Hara v. Luckenbach S. S. Co., 269 U. S.
364, 367, 368, 369 (1926) ; MAcLACHLAX, SHIPPING (6th ed. 1923) 151.
8. The Condor, i96 Fed. 71, 74 (1912); The Blake, I W. Rob. 73, 87, 88, 166
Eng. Rep. 5oo, 5o6 (1839). Contra: The S. S. Algic, 1937 A. M. C. 161i, 1625, 1630.
9. Against mistreatment: United States v. Borden, Fed. Cas. No. 14,625 (Dist. Ct.,
D. Mass. 1857) ; against unseaworthiness of vessel: United States v. Nye, Fed. Cas.
No. 15,9o6 (C. C. D., Mass. 1855) ; against master's endangering vessel: The Ulysses,
Fed. Cas. No. 14,330 (C. C. D., Mass. i8oo) (by implication).
io. I Annual Rep. N. L. R. B. 9 (1936) ; N. L. R. A. § 1; 47 STAT. 70, § 2.
ii. E. g., in time of war: Rossenwasser Bros., Inc. v. Pepper, 104 Misc. 457, 172
N. Y. Supp. 310 (i918).
12. See resolution of National Lawyers Guild adopted at second annual conven-
tion Feb. 21, 1938: I NAT. LAwYEas GUILD Q. 144.
13. Clark, dissenting Judge, stresses the safe return to the home port, but such
a limitation would greatly impair the efficacy of the strike which, as an economic
weapon, should be used as strategically as possible.
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underlying labor legislation. The ends of discipline would be better served
by recognizing seamen's right to satisfactory working conditions and the
concomitant rights necessary for securing them, rather than by following
the philosophy of Captain Bligh.1
4
Set-Off-Subrogated Surety's Right Against Receiver of Insol-
vent Bank When Original Claimant Could Have Recovered Only
Pro Rata Share-Surety Company executed bond conditioned upon
M's faithful performance as committee of an incompetent. Bank purchased
incompetent's estate's securities through M as president, crediting M's
individual account. M dissipated proceeds together with other funds of
Bank. After Bank had gone into receivership, Suirety Company paid estate
amount due on first bond. Receiver sued Surety Company on a second
bond covering employees' dishonesty. Held, Surety Company is entitled to
offset amount of estate's claim I as one subrogated thereto. Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation v. American Surety Company of New York, 39 F.
Supp. 551 (W. D. Ky. 1941).
Modem courts have limited the rights of subrogation of compensated
corporate, as distinguished from gratuitous individual, sureties.2 However,
by the overwhelming weight of authority, subrogation is allowed even to
the former against one who participates in the defalcation of a fiduciary
with knowledge, or negligently with notice, of his dishonesty. Here there
14. Rothschild, The Legal Implications of a Strike by Seamen (1936) 45 YALE
L. J. 1181, 1200; Weisthoff v. American-Hawaiian S. S. Co., 79 F. (2d) 124 (C. C.
A. 2d, 1935) (by implication). Contra: The position taken by the Department of
Commerce that the interests of commerce necessarily require strict discipline at all
times, and that seamen are not entitled to organize to protect their rights under the
N. L. R. A. This attitude was adopted in connection with a strike on the S. S. Califor-
nia in San Pedro harbor. See N. Y. Times, Mar. 15, 1936, p. I; Apr. 8, p. i; Apr.
9, p. 12. For complete citations on the incident, see 4 INT. Jumro. Ass'N BULL. No.
IIa, I, 13. See Note (1939) z8 Om L. Ray. 128.
i. The liability of Bank to estate was based upon the "sole-actor" exception to the
rule that knowledge gained by an agent while acting adversely to his principal's inter-
ests will not be imputed to the principal. Instant case, at 556. Recognition of the
fact that a "one-man corporation", as in the instant' case, can hardly "know" a fact
more thoroughly than when it is known by its "one man" makes feasible attainment
of the same goal by a less circuitous route. See Note (1941) 7 U. OF Pitr. L. Rav.
115, 122, n. 37.
2. Originally sureties were allowed subrogation to all the rights of those whom
they had indemnified. See STARNs, THE LAW OF SRmrlSHIP (4th ed. 1934) § 248.
This tendency was in accord with a generally favorable judicial attitude toward sure-
ties and with the policy of regarding the undertaking of the surety as strictissimi juris.
The modem attitude toward sureties is that it is their business to take risks and ex-
pect losses. See Atlantic Trust and Deposit Co. v. Town of Laurinburg, 163 Fed.
6go, 695 (C. C. A. 4th, i9o8) ; Loyd, The Surety (1917) 66 U. OF PA. L. REV. 4o, 66.
Accordingly, a growing number of decisions deny subrogation against one, who, al-
though answerable to the insured as a participant in the defalcation of the fiduciary,
was neither aware of the wrong nor negligent in failing to discover it. American
Surety Co. v. Lewis State Bank, 58 F. (2d) 559 (C. C. A. 5th, 1932) ; Meyers v. Bank
of America, ii Cal. (2d) 92, 77 P. (2d) 1084 (1938) ; see Washington Mech. Say.
Bank v. District Title Ins. Co., 65 F. (2d) 827, 830 (App. D. C. 1933); American
Surety Co. v. Citizens' Nat. Bank, 294 Fed. 6og, 616 (C. C. A. 8th, I923). Contra:
National Surety Co. v. Nat. City Bank, 184 App. Div. 771, 172 N. Y. Supp. 413 (1918).
But cf. National Surety Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 210 Iowa 323, 228 N. W. 635
(1930), ; Grubnau et al. v. Centennial Nat. Bank, 279 Pa. 5Ol, 124 At. 142 (1924) (re-
covery at law upon an assignment).
3. Richfield Nat. Bank v. American Surety Co. et al., 39 F. (2d) 387 (C. C. A. 8th,
193o) ; American Surety Co. v. Vann, 135 Ark. 291, 205 S. W. 646 (1918) ; National
Surety Corp. v. First Nat. Bank e.t al., 278 Ky. 273, 128 S. W. (2d) 766 (1939);
American Bonding Co. v. Nat. Mech. Bank, 97 Md. 598, 55 Atl. 395 (1903) ; Fidelity
and Deposit Co. v. Queens County Trust Co., 226 N. Y. 225, 123 N. E. 370 (1919) ;
Dobbins et al. v. Carrol et al., 137 Tenn. 133, 192 S. W. i66 (1916) ; Hall v. Windsor
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was knowledge.4 Therefore, the instant decision would appear correct on
the question of subrogation alone. However, the court was presented with
the further problem as to whether a set-off should be allowed.5 The
equitable principle that all general creditors should stand on the' same
footing comes into operation when a set-off is urged against an insolvent.
In the great majority of cases presenting problems similar to that of the
instant case, sureties have been denied the right to set-off.0 Slender au-
thority allows the set-off.7 There are dicta to the effect that a surety may
set-off a claim to which he was subrogated prior to receivership," but in
the instant case the payment upon which the claim to subrogation is based
occurred after receivership." The court's divergence from the settled path
of the law may be attributed to two misconceptions. First, that set-off
should be allowed because the surety was subrogated to a claim which
existed prior to insolvency. 0 Second, that allowance of the set-off does
not better the surety's position. 1 The first premise is not supported by
reported cases.' 2 The second is manifestly erroneous, a dollar for dollar
set-off being far more advantageous than a pro rata share in the assets.'8
Eminent authority has been influenced by consideration of the diminishing
effect of a set-off upon the assets available for distribution among ordinary
creditors3 4 This factor was ignored by the instant court. Nor does the
court seem to realize that its decision enables the surety to assert rights
greater than those which could have been asserted by the estate had there
been no subrogation. The result of the instant case is novel. Adherence
to precedent would appear more desirable.
Say. Bank, 97 Vt. 125, 121 At., 582 (1923). But see instant case at 557, where court
stated that subrogation might properly be denied against one liable solely because of
negligence in dealing with the fiduciary. This dictum can find support only in the
case of Louisville Trust Co. v. Royal Indemnity Co., 230 Ky. 482, 20 S. W. (2d) 71
(1929).
4. See note i supra.
5. "The right of subrogation carries with it all the securities held by the original
claimant, but this does not extend to the right to set-off a claim which the party en-
titled to subrogation did not own prior to [the time of receivership]." United States
Fidelity and Guaranty Co. v. Maxwell, 152 Ark. 64, 75, 237 S. W. 708, 712 (1922).
6. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co. v. Wooldridge, 268 U. S. 234 (1925);
Fidelity and Deposit Co. v. Robinson, 7 F. (2d) 371 (C. C. A. 9th, 1925) ; Springfield
Nat. Bank et al. v. American Surety Co., 7 F. "(2d) 44 (C. C. A. 6th, 1925) ; United
States Fidelity and Guaranty Co. v. Maxwell, 152 Ark. 64, 237 S. W. 708; Veigel v.
Converse, 168 Minn. 408, 21o N. W. 162 (1926). In these cases the attempted set-offs
were against insolvent banks the safety of deposits in which had been insured.
7. See Fidelity and Deposit Co. v. Duke, 293 Fed. 661, 665 (C. C. A. 9th, 1923)
(decided in surety's favor on other grounds).
8. See United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co. v. Maxwell, 152 Ark. 64, 74, 234
S. W. 708, 711 (1922) ; Veigel v. Converse, 168 Minn. 408, 409, 21o N. W. 162 (1926).
9. The Bank closed its doors on June 30, 1937. The receiver was appointed on
August 24, 1937. The successor committee recovered judgment against the surety on
March 9, 1938.
io. Instant case at 557.
ii. Ibid.
12. The dicta cited in note 8 supra require subrogation to, rather than mere exist-
ence of, the claim before receivership. A dictum supporting the court's position may
be found in Fidelity and Deposit Co. v. Duke, 293 Fed. 661, 665 (C. C. A. 9th, 1923)
(By a fiction subrogation was related back to the time of the obligation assumed).
However, application of the doctrine of relation for such a purpose was expressly
repudiated in United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co. v. Wooldridge, 268 U. S. 234,
238 (1925).
13. The court's premise is based on a comparison of the position in which the
surety would have been had the Bank remained solvent to the position resulting from
set-off against the insolvent Bank.
14. See Mr. Justice Holmes in United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co. v. Wool-
dridge, 268 U. S. 234, 238 (1925). The right to set-off was denied on the ground that
it would defeat the rights of third persons lawfully acquired.
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Statute of Limitations--Non-Recognition of Foreign Government
as Affecting Running of the Statute-Prior to recognition by our
government in 1933 the U. S. S. R. had no capacity to sue in our courts.
It now brings action to recover a sum of money deposited in 1921 by its
predecessor, the R. S. F. S. R. Held, claim barred by New York six year
statute of limitations. U. S. S. R. v. National City Bank of New York, 41
F. Supp. 353 (S. D. N. Y. 1941).1
The status of a foreign government is primarily a political question.
2
Such government cannot sue in American courts if unrecognized3 for it
then lacks international comity.4 Consequently, the U. S. S. R. was unable
to bring suit from 1917 to 1933, and it would, at first glance, seem logical
to toll the statute of limitations as with other litigants under a disability to
sue. 5 Because of the unusual Russian situation this could not be done. The
R. S. F. S. R. was officially recognized in 1917 and continued 6 to be until
1933 notwithstanding the actual control of the U. S. S. R.7 The recognized
government has the right of action which is not taken away from them upon
ouster by a new government but continues as long as recognition because it
rests in an omnipresent, ethereal "State" distinct from any particular gov-
I. The only precedent for this case is Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304
U. S. 126 (1937) which is cited in and followed by the instant case. The Guaranty
case is discussed in (1938) 32 Am. J. INT. LAW 542 and (1939) 37 Mica. L. REv. 931.
For a decision reaching the opposite result see the Guaranty case on first appeal,
91 F. (2d) 898 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937) commented on in (938) 5 U. OF CHL L. REV. 313
and (937) 47 YALE L. J. 132.
2. R. S. F. S. R. v. Cibrario, 235 N. Y. 255, 139 N. E. 259 (1923); Luther v.
Borden, 7 How. 1, 42, 43, 57 (U. S. 1849); United States v. Palmer, 3 Wheat. 6io,
616, 634 (U. S. 1818) ; HALL, INTERNATIONAL LAW (7th ed. 1917) 83 et seq; I MooRE,
DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1906) § 50.
The Cibrario case has been criticized by Professor Borchard in (1920) 31 YALE
L. J. 531.
For a general discussion of recognition and nonrecognition of foreign govern-
ments and the effect of both see I HAcKwoRTn, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
(0940) §§54, 55.
3. The Penza, 277 Fed. 9I (E. D. N. Y. 192); The Rogdai, 278 Fed. 294 (N.
D. Cal. I92o); R. S. F. S. R. v. Cibrario, 235 N Y. 255, 139 N. E. 259 (923);
Preobazhenski v. Cibrario, 192 N. Y. Supp. 275 (Sup. Ct. 1922); City of Berne v.
Bank of England, 9 Ves. Jr. 347 (I8O4).
However, nonrecognition does not in general abridge the rights of citizens of a
state the government of which has not been recognized to sue in our courts. Rus-
sian Volunteer Fleet v. United States, 282 U. S. 481 (931).
It is also true that an unrecognized foreign sovereign cannot be sued in our
courts. It is not subject to our laws unless it consents so to be. Wulfsohn v. R. S.
F. S. R., 234 N. Y. 372, 138 N. E. 24 (1923); (1932 Supp.) 26 AM. J. INT. LAW 527.
4. R. S. F. S. R. v. Cibrario, 235 N. Y. 255, 139 N. E. 259 (923).
"What is termed the comity of nations is the formal expression and ultimate
result of that mutual respect accorded throughout the civilized world by the repre-
sentatives of each sovereign power to those of every other, in considering the effects
of their official acts. Its source is the sentiment of reciprocal regard, founded on
identity of position and similarity of constitutions." Fisher, Brown & Co. v. Fielding,
67 Conn. 91, 1o8 (1895).
5. This is done with such disabilities to sue as infancy, insanity, and imprison-
ment. See 2 WooD, LimiTAToN op- AcrioNs (4th ed. 1916) c. 22, p. io69. For a
typical statute see N. Y. Crv. PRAc. Acr (Cahill, 6th ed. i93i) § 6o.
6. Until affirmative recognition is accorded by the political department, the prior
status may be deemed to continue. The Sapphire, ii Wall. 164 (U. S. 1870) ; Gel-
ston v. Hoyt, 3 Wheat. 246, 324 (U. S. 18i8) ; Rose v. Himeley, 4 Cranch. 241, 272
(U. S. i8o8); accord, Kennett v. Chambers, 14 How. 38 (U. S. 2852).
7. For the historical background see Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304
U. S. 126 (937).
The unrealistic attitude taken by the United States has been criticized. See
(1932) 26 Am. J. INT. LAW 261; (1922) 31 YALE L. J. 535, 537; see also (1939)
37 MrcH. L. RPv. 931, 933.
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ernment thereof." The distinction is necessary to give stability to interna-
tional transactions and safety to dealings with recognized governments. If
the claim rested with the government, it would disappear with the govern-
ment. The claim, resting in the "State," is clearly barred if the govern-
ment having the right of action does not exercise it within the statutory
period. The fact that the litigant is a foreign sovereign does not change
the law; as plaintiff it must bow to the law of the forum in which it suesf
Nor does the rule nullurn tempus occurrit regi 10 apply to a foreign sov-
ereign 1 for it is a rule designed to protect only the domestic sovereign
from the negligence of its public agents in not bringing suit. 12 This was
the legalistic reasoning of the Federal court. The same conclusion might
have been reached by applying the theory that recognition is retroactive."3
The U. S. S. R. is then considered as having had the ability to sue from its
very beginning and the statute would bar the action. A sounder and more
realistic basis for the decision is that of foreign policy. The U. S. S. R.
remained unrecognized for nearly sixteen years because of its failure to
meet international obligations.' 4 It confiscated American property, did
not accord our citizens proper protection, failed to respect the obligations of
preceding governments, and constantly interfered with the internal affairs
of other nations. The result was non-recognition, inability to sue in our
courts, and consequent loss of substantive rights through the operation of
the statute of limitations. To toll the statute would obviously make any
policy of non-recognition a far less compelling inducement to fulfillment of
international obligations.
Taxation-Bequest to Temperance and Prohibition Organization
Deductible From Federal Estate Tax-Under provision of Revenue
Act allowing deduction from estate tax of bequests to charitable institu-
tions,' petitioner claimed deduction of bequest to Board of Temperance,
Prohibition, and Public Morals of Methodist Episcopal Church, organized
8. Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U. S. 126 (937); State of Russia
v. Banker's Trust Co., 4 F. Supp. 417, 419 (S. D. N. Y. 1933), aff'd, 83 F. (2d) 326
(C. C. A. 2d, 1936), cert. denied, 299 U. S. 563 (x936) ; Russian Government v.
Lehigh Valley lR, 293 Fed. 133, 135 (S. D. N. Y. 1919), afftd, 21 F. (2d) 396
(C. C. A. 2d, 1927), cert. denied, 275 U. S. 571 (1927).
q. United States v. National City Bank of New York, 83 F. (2d) 236 (C. C.
A. 2d, 1936) ; The Gloria, 286 Fed. 188 (S. D. N. Y. 1923) ; Republic of Honduras
v. Soto, I12 N. Y. 310, 19 N. E. 845 (1889); (1932 Supp.) 26 Am. J. INT. LAW
5o5, 646.
io. "Time does not run against the king." The rule originated in the Crown's
prerogative, but survived in the United States on the basis of the great public
policy of preserving the public rights, revenues and property from injury and loss
by the negligence of public officers. Davis v. Corona Coal Co., 265 U. S. 219
(1924); Grand Trunk Western Ry. v. United States, 252 U. S. 112 (1920). The
policy was formulated by Justice Story in United States v. Hoar, 26 Fed. Cas. 329,
No. 15,373 (1821).
ii. Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U. S. 126 (1937); Royal Italian
Government v. International Committee of Y. M. C. A., 273 N. Y. 468, 6 N. E. (2d)
4o7 (1936). But see United States v. Thompson, 98 U. S. 486, 49o (1878).
12. Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 3o4 U. S. 126, 132 (1937); United
States v. Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry., I18 U. S. 120, 125 (885).
13. See United States v. Belmont, 301 U. S. 324, 330 (937) ; Oetjen v. Central
Leather Co., 246 U. S. 297, 302-303 (1918); Ricaud et al. v. American Metal Co.,
Lim., 246 U. S. 304, 309 (i918); Underhill v. Hernandez, 65 Fed. 577 (C. C. A.
2d, 1895), aff'd, 168 U. S. 250, 253 (1897); Williams v. Bruffy, 96 U. S. 176, 186
(1877); I HACxWoRTH, Diczsr oF INTEmxATIONAI. LAW (1940) 381.
14. (i933) 27 Am. J. INT. LAW 290; Am. Soc. INT. LAW PRoc. (193) 120, 131.
i. INT. R-v. CODE: § 812 (d) 194o; Revenue Act of 1926 § 303 (a) (3).
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to promote temperance by every legitimate means.2  Held (reversing Board
of Tax Appeals S), deduction allowed.' Bequest was for religious purpose
because of Board's close alliance with Church, even though Board attempts
to influence legislation to further its aims. Girard Trust Co., et al. v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 122 F. (2d) io8 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1941).
Bequests to any corporation organized and operated exclusively for
religious or charitable purposes are deductible from the federal estate tax.5
Although taxation is the rule, exemption the exception," tax statutes allow-
ing deduction of bequests to charitable institutions arise from motives of
public policy and are liberally construed.7  The principal controversy in
the instant case arose from the Board's attempts to influence legislation,8
a political rather than a religious activity.9 To surmount this difficulty,
the court made an analogy to the law of charitable trusts,10 which holds a
trust for the benefit of a temperance organization to be charitable. 1 The
court reasoned that, persuasion of others being merely incidental to its
main religious purpose, the Board meets the requirements of a charitable
trust; so a bequest to it is deductible from the tax. The fallacy of this
reasoning is that although a trust may be a charitable trust for another
purpose, it may nevertheless not be charitable within the meaning of a tax
statute.12  Deduction depends not on what the trust is called, but on the
terms of the statute.1 It is the function of courts to interpret the legisla-
tive intent. In view of the amendment to the act debarring institutions a
substantial part of whose work is t9 influence legislation, 14 the word "exclu-
2. For the objects of the Board see instant case lO9.
3. 41 B. T. A. 157.
4. Clark, J., dissents.
5. The Revenue Act of 1926 § 303 (a) (3) states, "The amount of all bequests
.to ...any corporation organized and operated exclusively for religious, charita-
ble, scientific, literary or educational purposes" is deductible from the 1ederal Estate
Tax.6. See United States v. Stewart, 311 U. S. 6O, 71 (i94o); United States Trust
Co. v. Helvering, 307 U. S. 57, 6o (1939).
7. See Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 3O U. S. 379, 383 (937); Hel-
vering v. Bliss, 293 U. S. 144, 15o, 151 (1934).
8. "We do not understand that either the commissioner or our dissenting brother
would question . . . the deduction here if the purpose of the activity of the Board
• . . stopped short of any possible attempts to influence . . . legislation". Instant
case io9.
9. A bequest to an organization engaged in efforts to procure the enactment and
repeal of laws is not within the exemption from the estate tax. Vanderbilt v. Com-
missioner, 93 F. (2d) 360 (C. C. A. Ist, 1937); Leubuscher v. Commissioner, 54 F.
(2d) 998 (C. C. A. 2d1932).
Io. Instant case log. The dissent also favored this approach. Instant case I11.
ii. 3 ScoT, TRUSTS (939) §374.1, 2001; 2 BOGERT, TRuSTS AND TRusm-s
(1935) § 379, 1212, and cases there cited. The court favors the view taken in a dis-
cussion of Slee v. Commissioner, 42 F. (2d) 184 (C. C. A. 2d, 1930) appearing in
(0931) 4 So. CALIF. L. REV. 418 in which charitable trust cases were discussed exclu-
sively. See Eagan v. Commissioner, 43 F. (2d) 881, 883 (C. C. A. 5th, 193o).
12. Cf. 3 ScoTT, TRuSTS (1939) § 375, 2018, 2029. For a discussion of the prin-
cipal features peculiar to charitable trusts see Dwan, Charities For Definite Persons
(1933) 82 U. OF PA. L. Rav. 12.
13. There is an analogy in the fact that in several state court decisions an ex-
emption of religious charitable corporations has not been allowed if the corporations
are of foreign origin. They are charitable but still not exempt from the tax. 4
CooLEY, TAXATION (1924) § 1738, 3473, 3474.
14. 26 U. S. C. A. INT. REv. AcTs (1926) p. 235 as amended in 1934. The
phrase, "and no substantial part of the activities of which is carrying on propaganda,
or otherwise attempting to influence legislation" was added to the act. Although the
amendment is not strictly applicable since death occurred before it was passed and
deductions must be made as of the time of death (see United States v. Provident
Trust Co., 291 U. S. 272, 281 (933)), since the word "exclusively" in the act
seems so ambiguous to the court, the amendment is useful in construing the intent of
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sively" in the statute is to be strictly regarded.15 The law favors an organ-
ization promoting the well-being of the community and is liberal toward it.
Some may regard a temperance Board as a promoter of the public welfare.
Were the bequest to fail as a perpetuity unless the Board were held to be
charitable, policy might demand a liberal attitude. But the instant case
has no effect on the bequest to the Board. The court is merely making
petitioner a gift of deduction, so the argument for a liberal interpretation
is not so forceful. In making the analogy to charitable trusts the court
realizes it is on tenuous ground.'8  In view of decisions in similar cases,
7
the result in the instant case seems unsatisfactory, certainly the method of
attaining it is undesirable. The charitable trust cases relied upon are state
decisions, unconcerned with taxation, 8 and should not color the interpre-
tation of a federal act. It is hoped that this analogy will not be followed in
the future for it will but lead to confusion.19
Taxation-Deductibility From Income of State Taxes Unpaid
But Accrued Under Unconstitutional and Misapplied Statutes-In its
Federal income tax reports, taxpayer corporation deducted from income'
in 1935, 1936, and 1937 taxes accrued on its books under the Pennsylvania
"Floor Tax Law" of 1933.2 The taxes were never paid, however, as State
the legislature with regard to "exclusively". Apparently it was meant to be used
in its narrow sense.
15. See note 3 .supra.
I6. "The majority of the charitable trust cases recognize the validity of a gift
to prohibit or minimize manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquor. They are iot
directly controlling, of course. But they furnish a strong analogy." (Italics added.)
Instant case 11O.
17. The court seems to be influenced by its reluctance to hinder the spread of
religion. That influencing of legislation was no small part of the Board's work
appears more clearly in the detailed presentation of the evidence in 41 B. T. A. 157,
161-163 (I94O). In other cases whenever legislative activity was evidenced, the
deduction was not granted. Vanderbilt v. Commissioner, 93 F. (2d) 36o (C. C. A.
Ist, 1937); Leubuscher v. Commissioner, 54 F. (2d) 998 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932);
Herbert E. Fales, 9 B. T. A. 828 (927). Cf. Slee v. Commissioner, 42 F. (2d) 184,
I85 (C. C. A. 2d, I93O). In Cochran v. Commissioner, 78 F. (2d) 176, 179 (C. C.
A. 4th, 1935) the court intimates that although a contribution to World League Against
Alcoholism was deductible, treatment of alcoholism is charitable, but a different de-
cision might have been reached had prohibition alone been advocated.
I8. The court relies on cases cited in SCOrr, op. cit. mtpra note 9, § 3741. But
merely because a trust is held charitable under state laws, it does not follow that it
Rill also be charitable under a federal Revenue act. See Eagen v. Commissioner, 43
F. (2d) 881, 883 (C. C. A. 5th, 1930). The dissent goes even farther afield in
adopting the "Massachusetts" and "English" view toward this situation. Instant
case 114. But interpretation of a federal Revenue act is a matter of federal, not
local law. Faulkner v. Commissioner, II2 F. (2d) 987, 992 (C. C. A. ist, i94o).
The admitted analogy in the instant case seems quite inapplicable.
i9. Money left to a boy or girl, to take an extreme example, who shall produce
the best calf or pig has been held to be charitable and not void for lack of a definite
beneficiary. Ashmore v. Newman, 350 Ill. 64, 183 N. E. I (0932). Would the
court hold this charitable within the Revenue act and so deductible from the tax?
Such situations as this will arise if the reasoning of this case is followed.
I. INT. REV. CODE § 23 (C) ('939), 26 U. S. C. A. § 23 (c) (940) : "§23. DE-
DUCTIONS FRo GROSS INCOMSE. In computing net income there shall be allowed as de-
ductions.
(c) Taxes Generally. Taxes paid or accrued within the taxable year .
2. Pa. Laws, Spec. Sess. 1933, p. 5, as amended by Pa. Laws, Spec. Sess. 1933, p.
94, known as the "Spirituous and Vinous Liquor Floor Tax Law". Taxpayer kept its
books on an accrual basis.
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granted repeated time extensions.3 In 1938 the Pennsylvania statute was
held unconstitutional.4 Commissioner of Internal Revenue disallowed the
deductions and assessed deficiencies in income tax for 1935, and in income
tax and undistributed profits surtax for 1936 and 1937.5 Taxpayer con-
tested the disallowance, and alternatively claimed credits against liability
for the surtax, producing evidence that amounts reserved to meet the
"Floor Tax" would otherwise have been distributed as dividends. Held,
deductions are allowable, for taxpayer acted under compulsion of the stat-
ute, which imposed a certain liability, and the taxes were'"accrued" within
Section 23 (c). J. A. Dougherty's Sons, Inc. v. Commissioner of Interna
Revenue, 121 F. (2d) 7oo (C. C. A. 3d, 1941).
Taxpayer corporation deducted from income in 1937 taxes accrued as
assessed, under the Mississippi gasoline tax law,6 against it as user of a
certain solvent. Taxpayer refused to pay,7 however, and in 1938 the gaso-
line tax law was held not applicable to the solvent.8 Then taxpayer
reported the amount of the deduction as income for 1938. Commissioner
disallowed the 1937 deduction and assessed deficiencies. Held (one mem-
ber dissenting), deduction properly disallowed, J. A. Dougherty Sons,
Inc. v. Commissioner being distinguishable as involving a statute uncon-
stitutional, not misapplied. Dixie Pine Products Co., 45 B. T. A. No. 50,
October 7, 1941.
The Dixie Pine Products decision checks the transition, seemingly
completed by the Dougherty case, in method of treatment of deductions of
taxes illegally extracted or assessed. Retroactive correction, once the
settled rule,9 seemed abandoned in favor of subsequent adjustment when
taxes merely accrued under an unconstitutional statute were held deduc-
tible. Particularly would the Dougherty case seem to cover the Dixie
Pine Products facts in view of two express declarations by the Board that
the same reasoning applies to these situations.1 0 Where a legal exaction is
3. Dougherty case at 7o1: "This method of enforcement was presumably chosen
by the State in order to have the question of the tax statutes validity judicially deter-
mined with least inconvenience to taxpayers in the event the statute was declared
invalid."
4. Commonwealth v. A. Overholt & Co., Inc., 331 Pa. 182, 200 Atl. 849 (1938).
5. Board affirmed the Commisssioner with little more than saying that there was
"no justification in this record for reversing the Commisssioner".
6. Laws of Miss. 1936, c. 162, §§ 5 (a), 8 (a). Liquid fuel was taxable if practi-
cally usable in operation of motor vehicles.
7. Taxpayer had paid the tax in 1936. Only one other company using like solvent
failed to pay in 1937. Taxpayer kept books on accrual basis, and this accrual was
made at direction of his attorneys, as books for 1937 were closed.
8. Taxpayer filed bill for injunction in 1936. Decisions rendered during the litiga-
tion are: Dixie Pine Products v. Dyer, 177 Miss. 873, 172 So. 145 (1937) ; Dyer v.
Dixie Pine Products Co., 186 Miss. 567, 191 So. 429 (939) (affirming decree). In
1938 Mississippi legislature by enactment exempted this particular solvent.
9. Inland Products Co. v. Blair, 31 F. (2d) 867 (C. C. A. 4th, 1929) ; Joseph v.
Horn, 23 B. T. A. 1131 (1931) ; Phillip C. Brown, io B. T. A. 122 (1938) ; G. C. M.
16491, XV-I Cum. BULL. 109 (1936) ; I. T. 2578, X-i CUM. BULL. ii9 (1928) (how-
ever, it was here conceded that subsequent adjustment would be easier) ; 0. D. 741, 3
Cum. BULL. 15 (1920); 3 PAUL & MERrxxs, LAW OF FEaERAL INCOME TAXATION
(0934) §§25.05, 25.49; Brown, The Treatment for Federal Income Tax Purposes of
Errors in. the Deduction of Other Taxes (1937) U. OF PA. L. RFv. 385. Brown's
article argues for subsequent adjustment as a more practical method and discusses all
the ways in which the problem arises. But the substantive law there set down is now
outmoded, and so spoken of in Cartex Mills, Inc., 42 B. T. A. 849, 896 (194o).
io. "But we think the amounts were none the less properly allowable deductions
in the years of payment because they were paid pursuant to void regulations of the
Commissioner instead of a void statute." Dixie Margarine Co., 38 B. T. A. 471, 475
(1938) (oleomargarine taxing act misapplied to taxpayer's product); "True, the
amounts here involved were not paid under an unconstitutional statute, but they were
illegally collected . . . and the same reasoning applies here." Guitar Trust Estate,
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refunded, subsequent adjustment is made.1 Where the exaction or charge
is completely illegal-under an unconstitutional statute-subsequent adjust-
ment is made.12 But the Board now holds an illegal exaction under a legal
statute distinguishable-and the correction must be retroactive. On state-
ment it appears hard to justify. The court in the Dougherty case con-
cluded that even an unconstitutional taxing statute imposed upon a tax-
payer a liability so definite and certain that accrual of it on a taxpayer's
books brought it within the terms of Section 23 (c) as a tax "accrued".
Though actually uncertain in both cases, the liability appeared more defi-
nite in the Pine Prdoucts case where payment was repeatedly demanded,13
as contrasted with Pennsylvania's postponements of due date. A taxpayer
seems as certainly under compulsion when a taxing statute is misapplied as
when it is unconstitutional. 4 That the former occurs more often makes
the amount no less a proper accrual 15 or basis for deduction. There seems
to be no legal distinction between the cases, and the Inland'6 case, indis-
tinguishable from, and relied on by the Board in the Dixie Pine Products
case, thus seems to have been overruled by the Dougherty case.
Since the taxpayer should bear the exact tax liability to which he
would have been subject had the illegal charge not been made, retroactive
correction is theoretically the correct and more fair method.17  However,
under that rule, running of the statute of limitations or assessment period
posed injustices. ". . . Taxation is a practical matter." 18 Convenience
to taxpayer and Commissioner and desire for certainty of tax liability made
evident the fairness of determining "income tax liability on annual periods
on the basis of facts as they exist in each period", 9 and subsequent adjust-
34 B. T. A. 857, 874 (1936) (trust wrongly taxed as association). By prior Board
decision, it is not objectionable that these declarations are from cases in which the
statute of limitations had run: M & N Cigar Manufacturers, Inc., 42 B. T. A. lopi,
1093 (1940) (holding refunded taxes paid under A. A. A. properly deductible). "We
think that the fact that a refund has been made to petitioner does not serve to dis-
tinguish it from the Cartex Mills, Inc., case." The statute of limitations is never a
present consideration where, as in the Dougherty case, the tax had merely accrued.
Section 23 (c) indicates that accruals are to be deducted just as are payments. See
note i, supra.
ii. Estate of Win. H. Block, 39 B. T. A. 338 (1939); Mim. 3958, XI-2 Cum.
BULL. 33 (1932) (refund of legally collected customs duties); 3 PAUL & MERTENS, op.
cit. supra note 9, at 213.
12. J. A. Dougherty Sons, Inc., v. Commissioner, 121 F. (2d) 700 (C. C. A.
3d, 1941) ; M & N Cigar Manufacturers, Inc., 42 B. T. A. iogi (194o).
13. Dixie Pine Products case at p. 2. Also see note 7, supra.
14. "The taxing act does not require the taxpayer to be an incorrigible optimist."
United States v. S. S. White Dental Manufacturing Co., 274 U. S. 398 (1927).
". .. neither can one really be expected to anticipate the many difficult and technical
rulings which are going to be made sometime in the future with respect to application
of existing tax laws." Brown, note 9 supra, at 400.
15. It is settled that when ". . . all the events . . . occur which fix the amount
of the tax and determine the liability of the taxpayer to pay it", the tax is accrued.
United States v. Anderson, 269 U. S. 422, 441 (1926) ; 3 PAUL & MERTENS, Op. Cit.
supra note 9, § 25.31. Clearly "accrued" is exclusive of "paid" as used in Section 23(c).-c 6. Inland Products Co. v. Blair, io B. T. A. 235 (1928), aff'd, 3 F. (2d) 867
(C. C. A. 4 th, 1929). This case is inferentially criticized in Estate of Win. H. Block,
39 B. T. A. 338, 341 (1939), and throughout Brown, oc. cit. supra note 9. The other
case relied on by the Board, Mary W. Leach v. Commissioner, 16 B. T. A. 781 (1929),
aff'd, 5o F. (2d) 371 (C. C. A. ist, 1931), is one involving good faith overpayment.
It expressly followed the Inland case.
17. The method is criticized in Brown, loc. cit. suepra note o, as impractical.
18. Cartex Mills, Inc., 42 B. T. A. 894, 898 (194o) ; cf. Brandeis, J., in Lucas v.
American Code Co., 28o U. S. 445, 449 (193o).
ig. This quotation has ripened into a statement of the general principle of subse-
quent adjustment, and is found in substance at least at: M & N Cigar Manufacturers,
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ment was repeatedly held proper.20  Accruals cannot, under the terms of
Section 23 (c), consistently be treated differently from payments, but the
practical considerations which before influenced the Board were not pres-
ent when there was no actual payment, and it refused in both instant cases
to allow deductions. But in the Dougherty case a new injustice-subject-
ing the taxpayer to a surtax to which he would not have been subject but
for the unconstitutionality of the Pennsylvania taxing law-was presented
by the conclusion of the Board and the Court that credits against undis-
tributed profits surtax were not allowable under the Act.21 This injustice
the court tried to avoid by allowing the deductions.2 2 So far had the Board
gone, 2  however, that the Dougherty case seemed merely to settle the rule
that illegally extracted or assessed taxes are deductible, and refunds are
income of the year in which received, and accrued amounts income of the
year in which the invalidity of the levy is determined. But in the Dixie
Pine Products case, there was not any such practical consideration as sup-
ports the rule of the Dougherty case.2 4  Moreover, retroactive correction
would here favor the government, and the taxpayer was asserting tax lia-
bility for 1937, which he then strenuously denied. Thus the Board reached
the opposite result on a purely factual distinction. However desirable flexi-
bility may seem, tax law, by such processes as here discussed, breeds error,
doubt, and repeated litigation. Either the Board followed substantially
contradicted law, disapproving of the Dougherty case as bad law made by a
hard case, or it made an "indistinguishable distinction".
Torts-Charge That Private Citizen Is Reporting Law Violators
as Defamation-Complaint alleged that defendant falsely and mali-
ciously stated that plaintiff, who is proprietor of service station and room-
ing house primarily patronized by truck drivers under I. C. C. jurisdiction,
was informing I. C. C. officials of names of truck drivers who were violat-
Inc., 42 B. T. A. O91 (194o) ; Central Loan & Investment Co,. 39 B. T. A. 981, 983
(1939); Estate of Win. H. Block, 39 B. T. A. 338, 341 (1939); Dixie Margarine
Co., 38 B. T. A. 471, 474 (1938); Chevy Chase Land Co., 34 B. T. A. 150, 153
(1936) ; South Dakota Concrete Products Co., 26 B. T. A. 1429, 1432 (1932).
2o. Taxes paid under unconstitutional statute: M & N Cigar Manufacturers, Inc.,
42 B. T. A. lO91 (194o) ; Cartex Mills, Inc., 42 B. T. A. 894 (294o) ; Central Loan &
Investment Co., 39 B. T. A. 981 (1939); Chevy Chase Land Co., 34 B. T. A. 15o
(1936) ; Chas. W. Nash, 34 B. T. A. 675 (1936), aff'd, 88 F. (2d) 477 (1936) ; Chas.
F. Fawcett, 30 B. T. A. 908 (i93) ; E. L. Bruce Co., ig B. T. A. 777 (930) (as
business "loss"). Misapplied taxing acts and taxes paid thereunder: Dixie Margarine
Co., 38 B. T. A. 471 (1938) ; Guitar Trust Estate, 34 B. T. A. 857 (1936) ; Houbi-
gant, Inc., 31 B. T. A. 954 (934). Cases cited at Estate of Win. H. Block, 39
B. T. A. 338, 341 (1939) hold similarly where refund is of items deducted as taxes, ex-
penses, losses, or bad debts.
21. "We agree with that conclusion, but the matter is no longer of impor-
tance . . ." Dougherty case, p. 7o2, after extensively commenting upon the hardship.
The undistributed profits surtax deficiency was: for 1936, $,97947; for 1937, $14,-
117.94-
22. The Board ignored this saying: "The argument based upon equity is of no
avail where there is no statutory provision allowing a credit." 42 B. T. A. 892, 893
(0940).
23. M & N Cigar Manufacturers, Inc., 42 B. T. A. 19oi (940) differed only
from Dougherty case in that there was payment and refund rather than accrual. The
same result was reached in both, and the Dougherty case thus seemed to carry that
transition to completion. It was expectable since under Section 23 (c), no valid dis-
tinction could be made on grounds of payment instead of accrual.
24. In Estate of David Davies, 42 B. T. A. 965, 969 (I94o), decided on the
Board's decision in Dougherty case, it was said that since all the facts were known in
a case where there had been no payment, it was "more just and infinitely more practi-
cal" to correct retroactively.
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ing I. C. C. regulations. General allegation of damage through loss of
trade of truck drivers as result of defendant's false statement. Held, on
demurrer, complaint dismissed without leave to amend, since defendant's
language was not defamatory. Connelly v. McKay, 28 N. Y. S. (2d) 327
(Sup. Ct. 194).
For a statement to be defamatory it must tend to lower the person
spoken of in the estimation of a substantial portion of the community whose
standard of opinion the court can properly recognize.i The instant case
presents the seldom litigated problem 2 whether it is defamatory to charge
a person with reporting law violators to the 15roper authorities. In holding
such a statement not defamatory, the instant case is in accord with the
other cases on the point.' It might well be contended that persons whose
standards are considered quite respectable by the community, would enter-
tain a low opinion of a private citizen who took it upon himself to report
all law violators to the authorities, especially where such persons consid-
ered the violations reported to be trivial ones or where they considered the
law itself to be bad. The basic proposition underlying such a standard of
opinion, however, is that some laws are more worthy than others of enforce-
ment "by all possible means"-that petty violations not discovered by the
regular authorities should go unpunished. And for a court to admit such
a standard to be "respectable" in any case, it would perforce approve the
underlying proposition.4 This, it is submitted, no court would or should
do. Therefore the decision of the instant case on the defamation question
is the proper one,5 and doubtless will be followed whenever the problem
again arises. However, a false statement such as the one involved here,
if made with the intention of injuring a person's business and if it accom-
plishes that result, should be actionable as an intentional tort.6 In such an
i. Peck v. Tribune Co., 214 U. S. 185, 19o (19oo) (used the phrase "considerable
and respectable class in the community") ; Mawe v. Pigott, 4 Ir. R. C. L. 54 (1869);
RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1938) § 559, comment e.
2. Only two other cases on the point, which are cited infra note 3, have been
discovered by the writer.
3. Mawe v. Pigott, 4 Ir. R. C. L. 54 (1869) (statement that plaintiff, a parish
priest, had said that he would cause Irish rebels to be prosecuted for a political
offense); see Hallock v. Miller, 2 Barb. 630 (N. Y. 1848) (statement that plaintiff,
an innkeeper, was -engaged in serving writs on anti-renters and catching Indians).
4. In Wiley v. Oklahoma Press Pub. Co., io6 Okia. 52, 233 Pac. 224 (1924),
(1925) 11 VA. L. REv. 647, a somewhat analagous situation was presented in which,
however, the court was not faced with this dilemma. In that case the plaintiff's ex-
cusing the action of a policeman who had shot and killed plaintiff's son, was described
by defendant in terms which implied that plaintiff had approved the action and com-
mended the policeman. Emphasizing this implication in the publication, the court held
the publication defamatory as tending to lower the plaintiff in the estimation of per-
sons whose standards the court could recognize.
5. However the court's reasoning to support its decision was, in one particular,
very weak. At 329 the court said: "To hold otherwise would be contrary to the pub-
lic interest, in that it would be contrary to the public interest, in that it would penalize
the law-abiding citizen and give comfort to the law violator. It would impede law
enforcement for the benefit of the anti-social." It is difficult to see how a contrary
holding would produce a single one of the results suggested by the court.
6. See HARPER, LAW o" TORTS (1933) § 235. At page 498 the author says: "If
the statement is not defamaory, no action of defamation will lie. It does not follow
that there may be no tort. If nondefamatory words are falsely spoken with the inten-
tion of harming the plaintiff, an action may lie for the harm intentionally inflicted, but
it will not be an action for defamation, and will not be governed by the principles con-
trolling such actions. 'Injurious falsehood,' as it is called by some writers, will be gov-
erned by the general principles of tort law applicable to intended wrongs." This propo-
sition is illustrated in Ratchliffe v. Evans, [1892] 2 Q. B. 524 (false statement that
plaintiff, a business man, had gone out of business, spoken with intent to injure the
plaintiff); see Morasse v. Brochu, 151 Mass. 567, 574, 25 N. E. 74, 77 (189o).
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action the court would not be compelled to decide whether such activity
would lower the actor in the opinion of "respectable" persons,7 and hence
the objections to the maintenance of the action of defamation would not
arise."
Trusts-Reappraisement of Mortgaged Property at Transfer of
Participating Mortgage Certificates-Corporate co-trustee reassigned
participating mortgage certificates I from one trust to others, being fidu-
ciary for all, and, at petition of beneficiaries, was surcharged? for failing
to reappraise the mortgaged property at time of transfers in 1931 and
1932; s the original appraisement was made in 1929.4  On exceptions,
Held (two judges dissenting), surcharge removed, reappraisement not
necessary, fiduciary acted with due caution. Crane's Estate, 5 41 D. & C.
337 (Orphans' Court, Phila. County 194).
Appraisement of mortgaged property is required to determine its fair
value, for ordinarily an investment in a bond must be secured by a higher-
valued mortgage in some designated ratio-here two-thirds.6 In the instant
case, the majority 7 found reappraisement at each reassignment of partici-
pating certificates too burdensome, in that this requisite would discourage
this type of investment in cases-unlike the present-where reappraise-
ment costs would absorb all or a large part of the investment fund. The
dissenters favored reappraisement, asserting a transfer necessitated as
much care as the original investment.8 Logically, a transfer by a fiduciary
of a given group of participation certificates from one trust to another is,
as to the transferee, a new investment. Hence, to require appraisement
7. Even if the plaintiff lost only the business of the lawbreakers themselves, that
fact would seem to be no objection to the action for "injurious falsehood." While the
courts would doubtless protect only a lawful business, as they do in the analagous situa-
tion in defamation, still it can scarcely be denied that the plaintiff's business of selling
gas and lodging even to truck drivers who were violating I. C. C. regulations was
perfectly legitimate and lawful.
8. In all probability, however, this court would have dismissed an action for "in-
jurious falsehood," judging from its attitude as indicated by the language quoted
spra 'ote 5.
i. For definition of mortgage participation certificates see BoGERT, THE LAw OF
TRusTs AND TaUSTEES (1935) § 676. These certificates may no longer be sold to the
public, 21 D. & C. 299 (1934).
2. Under the surcharge, the trustee is forced to assume the underlying obligation,
replacing it with cash. This in effect removes all risk from trust. See RESTATE-
MENT, TRUSTS (1935) §210.
3. The years are obviously significant since the property had no market as a re-
sult of the 1929 financial collapse.
4. The real estate was in the heart of the business section of Philadelphia, was
appraised at $5,oooooo, and was security for a bond of $2,500,ooo given by the woman
then reputed to be the wealthiest in the United States.
5. Cf. Seager Estates, 340 Pa. 73, 16 A. (2d) ig (194o) (wherein reappraise-
ment was not required but the governing statute was one of 1923) ; Swindell's Estate,
332 Pa. i6I, 3 A. (2d) 2 (1938) (wherein there was an allegation that there was no
reappraisement at time of reassigning participation certificates, but the court disre-
garded the allegation on the ground there was no proof). But cf. Connell's Estate, 32
D. & C. 20 (Orphans' Court, Phila. County, 1938).
6. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 20, § Ol. Mortgage participation certifi-
cates are legal investments for trusts: Guthrie's Estate, 320 Pa. 530, 182 Atl. 248
(1936) ; Cricls Estate, 315 Pa. 581, 173 Atl. 327 (1934).
7. The majority distinguished between market value and intrinsic value, apparently
assuming the latter had not been influenced by the financial collapse of 1929.
8. The standard for fiduciaries is pronounced by the courts to be common skill,
prudence, and caution. Detre's Estate, 273 Pa. 341, 350, 117 Atl. 54, 57 (1922). For
duties owed by the trustees to the beneficiary in making investments, see REsTATE M T,
TRUSTS (935) §227.
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at the time of the transferor's investment and no reappraisement at the
time of the transferee's investment is unfair to the transferee. And in
transactions where the fiduciary is not acting solely for one trust but is
dealing with two trusts as fiduciary for both, the utmost care is necessary
to insure fairness to each trust.9 Further, the applicable statute 10 requires
that the secured bond does not exceed two-thirds the fair value of the
mortgaged property. A sharp decline in real estate values might push the
ratio of bond to mortgage above the legal limit, thereby rendering the
investment in reassigned certificates illegal."1 To argue that reappraise-
ment will discourage this type of investment is to put the interest in the
existence of the investment above the interest in the safety of the invest-
ment, which is contrary to trust doctrine. Finally, if a fiduciary does not
wish to reappraise at each reassignment, it can, as a practical matter, accept
the surcharge and assume the obligation by replacing it with cash. Then,
at foreclosure, if the fiduciary was correct in its decision not to reappraise,
it would realize the amount of the bond and, therefore, lose nothing.1 2
Wills-Admissibility to Probate after Concealment by Executrix
-Widow, possessing deceased husband's will naming her executrix and
knowing its contents, took oath in petition for appointment as administra-
trix that deceased died intestate.1 Children of the deceased by a former
marriage, although aware of the existence of the will, did not petition to
have it admitted to probate. Widow discovered she would benefit more
under the will, and submitted it to the probate court one year and eight
months after the thirty-day period set by statute; 2 and children, who would
have benefited more under intestacy laws,3 opposed probation. Held, (two
justices dissenting) ,4 widow may not repudiate her chosen course of action,
and is estopped to submit the will to probate. Dowd et al. v. Dowd, 115
P. (2d) 409 (Idaho, '94').
9. See Connell's Estate, 32 D. & C. 20, 23 (Orphans' Court, Phila. County, 1938);
"Where the trustee is trustee of two trusts if he enters into a transaction involving
dealing between the two trusts, he must justify the transaction as being fair to each
trust." RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS (1935) § 170, comment q.
10. PA. STAT. ANN. -(Purdon, 193o) tit. 20, § 8oi. The statute has been amended,
for present statutory provisions see PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. 194o) tit. 20,
§ 8or. The present statute requires no new appraisement on reassigning if there has
been an appraisement within the previous three years. But in addition there is a pro-
vision that written certification be made at time of reassignment by a reputable person
familiar with real estate values in the vicinity that at the time of transfer the face
amount of the bond is not more than two-thirds the fair value of the mortgaged prop-
erty. This looks very much like an appraisement requirement.
ii. Note (1932) 41 YALE L. J. 455, 458.
12. Suggested in instant case at 346.
i. She had previously consulted a lawyer who expressed doubt concerning the
validity of the will. This doubt was probably induced by the widow's divorce, prop-
erty settlement, and subsequent remarriage with the deceased, the will antedating all
these events.
2. IDAHO CODE ANN. (1932) § 15-201: "Every custodian of a will, within thirty
days after receipt of information that the maker thereof is dead, must deliver the same
to the probate court having jurisdiction of the estate, or to the executor named therein.
A failure to comply with the provisions of this section makes the person failing respon-
sible for all damages sustained by anyone injured thereby."
3. Under the will, the children would have received each only $25.oo from an
estate that was worth over $20,000.00.
4. Givens, dissenting J., thought that the widow had made an innocent mistake of
law concerning the validity of the will, and hence was unwilling to penalize her. This
point is questionable in view of her oath that the deceased died intestate. See note i
moura.
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Although the majority opinion is ostensibly based on estoppel, as the
dissent points out, the vital elements of an estoppel are missing. The
children, knowing the will's existence and probably its contents, 5 could
not have relied on false representations; and the widow's willingness to
pay the costs of the suit contesting the will, as ordered by the district
court, eliminates any substantial financial loss suffered by the children.
The case brings into conflict two principal aims of the court, which coin-
cide with the legislative intent of the statutes stating the duty of custodians
of wills; 1 namely, to fulfill completely the desires of the deceased,7 and
to establish wills and dispose of estates with the least possible delay and
expense." In most disputes over wills a compromise between the two aims
is effected; but in this case, since the executrix concealed the will to her
own detriment,9 the court is faced with alternatives that are mutually ex-
clusive. Since preventing the concealment of wills and protracted litiga-
tion generally furthers the interests both of testators and .of society, this
should be the controlling factor. Although this decision is anomalous in
that it established a rule to protect testators by ignoring the intent of this
particular testator, it is highly desirable in the long view. It is suggested,
however, that public policy would furnish a sounder foundation than
estoppel.
5. The testimony cited in the dissenting opinion is an indication of this fact. In-
stant case at 413, 414.
6. See 2 PAGE, ON WSLS (3d ed. 194) § 592. The duty of custodians of wills is
discussed in Tator v. Valden, 124 Conn. 96, 198 Atl. 16q, -117 A. L. R. 1243, 1249
(1938). Some jurisdictions place a duty on the custodian to probate. Snyder v.
Security-First National Bank of Los Angeles, 31 Cal. App. (2d) 66o, 88 P. (2d) 760
(1939) ; Tator v. Valden, supra; Avery's Appeal, 117 Conn. 201, 167 Atl. 544 (933) ;
In re Wah-Kon-Tah-He-Ump-Ah, 128 Okla. 179, 261 Pac. 973 (1927). Contra:
Brown v. Eggleston, 53 Conn. 110, 2 Atl. 321 (1885) ; Shaw v. Moderwell, 1O4 Ill. 64
(1882) ; Dodd v. Anderson, 197 N. Y. 466, 90 N. E. 1137 (i9og).
7. Durell v. Martin, 172 Tenn. 97, 102, 110 S. W. (2d) 316, 317 (1937): "The
cardinal rule in the construction of wills is to give effect to the intention of the tes-
tator." It would seem that this should be the cardinal rule with respect to all conduct
concerning the will. Cf. In re Bronson's Estate, 185 Wash. 536, 547, 55 P. (2d) io75,
1079 (1936).
8. Since the statutes generally provide thirty or forty day limits for probation
(after notice of death is received), it is clear that one of the main purposes is to settle
the estate as quickly as possible. Some statutes go so far as to make concealment of
wills a misdemeanor. W. VA. CoDE (1931) § 41-5-I; TNr. CoDE (1932) § 0942.
But see note 2 .upra.
9. The statutes do not provide for such a situation, since they usually make the
concealer of a will liable only to others who suffer injury thereby. See note 2 supra;
cf. notes 6 and 8 supra.
